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A new urgency is emerging around nuclear power development and this urgency is accentuated 
by the post-tsunami events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. This urgency 
extends beyond these dramatic events in Japan, however, to many other regions of the world 
and  situations  where  nuclear  power  development  is  receiving  renewed  attention  as  an 
alternative to carbon-based energy sources. As a contribution to the growing public debate 
about nuclear power development, this paper offers a set of insights into the social and ethical 
aspects of nuclear power development by drawing from published literature in the humanities 
and social sciences. We offer insights into public risk perception of nuclear power at individual 
and national levels, the siting of nuclear waste repositories, the changing policy context for 
nuclear power development, social movements, and the challenges of risk management at the 
institutional level. We also pay special attention to the ethical aspects of nuclear power with 
attention to principles such as means and ends, use value and intrinsic value, private goods and 
public  goods,  harm,  and  equity  considerations.  Finally,  we  provide  recommendations  for 
institutional design and performance in nuclear power design and management.  
Keywords: nuclear power, risk perception, social context, megaprojects, energy production, 
applied ethics, social values, social movements, complexity, hazards, disaster response 
JEL Classification: Q40, Z00 
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 INTRODUCTION 
A new urgency is emerging around nuclear power development around the world, and this 
urgency is accentuated by the post-tsunami events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
plant in Japan. But the urgency extends beyond these dramatic events in Japan to many other 
regions of the world and situations where nuclear power development is receiving renewed 
attention as an alternative to carbon-based energy sources. In the debates and discussions 
around nuclear power development, there is considerable attention to technical questions such 
as design and cost, but there is also attention to social issues such as public perception, risk 
assessment,  social  acceptability,  and  public  accountability.  As  a  contribution  to  this  public 
discussion, this paper offers a set of insights into the social and ethical considerations related to 
nuclear power development that are drawn from published literature in the humanities and 
social sciences.  
Sections of this paper were published in a previous report by the Environmental Studies and 
Research  Centre,  University  of  Alberta  (Davidson  2010),  but  this  paper  offers  a  more 
comprehensive  summary  of  this  literature  and  another  contribution  to  this  ongoing  public 
dialogue. 
Social science understandings of nuclear power and nuclear waste are generally located within 
the field of risk theory, social risk assessment, and institutional responses to risk evaluation. A 
basic premise in this literature is that citizens view risks in ways that are different from experts, 
but instead of being uninformed and irrational, these views turn out to be systematic and 
rational. In this sense, the views of average citizens (on issues of nuclear power or other risk 
issues such as smoking or motorcycles) involve a rationality that is consistent but different from 
expert views of the same risks.  
The risk literature also includes the idea of a ‘risk society’ whereby society is being transformed 
from one that is organized around the distribution of ‘goods’ such as wealth and resources to 
one that is organized around the distribution of ‘bads,’ or risks such as pollution or crime (Beck 
1992, 2009). Moreover, new risks are different from old risks in that many new risks such as 
climate change or genetic modification are often beyond the scope of a human lifetime or 
beyond human perception. Because of these fundamental transformations in the risk society, a 
focus on risk management has become a key concept. Finally, research in this field addresses 
not only individual views on risk but also views of risk and risk management at the level of 
institutions and governance. Within this literature, analysis is focused on the ways that risks are 
managed or mismanaged by agencies and how risk issue management can be improved. 
Given this focus on risk theory and risk management, definitions of risk are an important first 
step in understanding the contribution of social science literature to the question of nuclear 3 
 
power.  Taken  from  Rohrmann  and  Renn  (2000),  risk  is  “understood  as  the  possibility  that 
human actions, situations or events might lead to consequences that affect aspects of what 
humans  value”  (p.14).  The  idea  of  human  values  is  central  to  this  definition.  Families, 
communities, future generations, environments, wildlife, and many other dimensions of human 
value are wrapped up in questions of nuclear power development. Conversely, if human values 
are not in question, then we are no longer talking about risks and risk management. Because of 
this  link  to  values,  this  paper  positions  risk  assessment  and  management  as  an  ethical 
deliberation. A key point here is that risks (and nuclear power more specifically) are inseparably 
linked to what people consider important to themselves and therefore represent a risk issue in 
broad terms. Experts, in particular, may argue that probabilities of harm are low from nuclear 
power, but given the link to human values (and ongoing public concern about nuclear power 
development), risk management will remain at the heart of the debate about nuclear power 
development for a long time to come. If risk is understood in terms of the Rohrmann and Renn 
definition above, then decisions about nuclear energy must weigh between competing value 
sets as they are put at risk by different nuclear choices. In this sense, ethics is a process of 
determining what is “good” and how we should develop things in order to facilitate more of the 
good. Institutions and social interaction implicitly make ethical decisions on a constant basis, 
but doing ethics is to make these decisions more explicitly, carefully, and with fuller awareness 
of the goods involved in different choices.  
Ethics are integral to decision-making and not something done separately. Other considerations 
–  technical  issues,  economic  calculations,  possible  ecological  damage,  climate  change 
mitigation, risk assessments and so on – are pieces of information that feed into the decision-
making about nuclear power. But the decisions cannot be made on technical information alone. 
Decisions depend on what various actors consider to be “the good” and what value they attach 
to  each  of  the  pieces  of  information.  For  example,  cost-benefit  analyses  (which  are  often 
calculated in monetary terms) do not automatically decide a matter. If we accept that higher 
dollar figures on the benefit side show us which decisions to make, an ethical decision about 
what constitutes “the good” has first been made: the good is that which makes or saves more 
money. This ethical decision also assumes that all goods and bads can be measured on the 
single metric of money. 
In keeping with this desire for a more information-rich  and transparent context for making 
ethical decisions about nuclear power, this paper offers a strategic literature review on risk 
perception,  nuclear  waste  management,  the  emerging  policy  debates,  the  institutional 
dimensions of risk issue management and then concludes with a discussion of applied ethics as 
relevant to social decision-making. We do not offer an exhaustive literature review, but one 
that is focused on several relevant risk issues and one that draws on seminal scholarship and 
key ideas. Also, as a contribution to the debate about nuclear power development in Canada 4 
 
and around the world, personal commentaries, editorial views and consideration of past or 
current events is minimized. Instead, readers are invited to reflect on this literature as a way of 
understanding the social dimensions of nuclear power within any given context.  
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND NUCLEAR POWER 
PUBLIC VIEWS ON NUCLEAR POWER 
Citizens view nuclear power relative to many facets of their lives and things they value, and 
base  their  perceptions  on  these  dimensions  rather  than  scientific  or  technical  information. 
Seminal research on public perceptions of nuclear power has been conducted by Paul Slovic 
and colleagues over the past 30 years. In a key article from 1987, Slovic takes survey data from 
different lay members of the public as well as a group with expertise in risk assessment and 
describes the systematic differences in risk perception between these groups. A major finding 
from this study is the systematic way in which risk activities were ranked by these different 
groups and the striking difference between lay risk perception and expert risk perception. Table 
1 indicates that nuclear power is ranked by the lay groups as a highly risky technology whereas 
experts ranked nuclear power in the bottom tier of risks (20th of a total of 30 risk activities or 
technologies).  
Unlike many other risky technologies or activities identified within this study, Slovic notes that 
nuclear power is a unique type of risk within the public’s imagination, occupying a polarized set 
of perceptions relative to other types of risks. This position – the dramatic difference between 
lay perception and expert perception of risk from nuclear power in particular – has resulted in 
considerable discussion about the originating drivers or determinants of this difference. Slovic’s 
key  argument  is  that  lay  risk  perceptions  are  often  different  from  expert  risk  perceptions 
because  lay  understandings  of  risk  are  often  more  textured,  drawing  more  than  narrower 
technical determinations of risk.  
Table 1. Ordering of perceived risks from activities and technologies. Source: Slovic (1987).   
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As an example, when experts are asked to judge risks, they often refer to technical estimates 
such as annual death rates or morbidity to judge one risky technology versus another. When lay 
people are asked to judge risks by estimating annual fatalities, their judgments are often in line 
with expert judgments. Normally, however, when lay people are asked to judge risks they do so 
by drawing attention to a broader set of concerns. When risks are judged to be high, it is often 
because “these risks are unknown, dreadful, uncontrollable, inequitable, catastrophic and likely 
to  affect  future  generation”  (Slovic  1987,  p.  236).    Such  key  dimensions  of  risk  judgment 
discerned  in  this  study  (and  in  other  similar  studies)  show  that  lay  people  are  not  in  fact 
irrational, uninformed or overly emotional about certain types of risk, but are acting upon fairly 
predictable patterns of judgment that are based on certain aspects of a given risk concern 
relative to what they value. Whereas technical experts base their judgments on probabilities of 
harm or estimates of annual fatalities, lay people base their judgments on a sense that the risks 
threaten  things they  value,  such  as  future  generations,  stability, or  the  capacity  to  control 
technology. Norgaard (2011) highlights a similar need for what she calls “ontological security” 
relative to climate change. Aspects of dread and unknowability, in particular, have led some 
researchers  to  concluded  with  some  force that  public  risk  perception regarding  radioactive 
materials and nuclear power more generally should be understood as a kind of “risk DNA” – or 
internalized response – that should be treated like any other “essential fact” of nuclear power 
development. For instance, Erikson and colleagues state that: 
The ability to evoke dread in human beings must be counted as one of the key 
properties of radioactive wastes, not just a passing fact about human life. . . . Not 
to know that essential fact about nuclear wastes is like not knowing their half-
lives,  their  thermal  qualities,  or  any  of  their  other  physical  and  chemical 
characteristics (Erikson et al. 1994, p. 91). 
Such  factors  as  dread  and  unknowability  and  preferences  for  stability  and  controllability 
contribute to public understandings of risk and how the public is likely to respond to a risk issue 
such as nuclear power.  
In addition to these key dimensions of risk perception identified by Slovic and his colleagues, 
researchers have discovered other factors that shape risk perception as well. For instance, in a 
systematic review of 36 existing studies that measured gender differences in concern regarding 
nuclear power, all studies showed that women were more concerned than men about these 
issues  (Freudenburg  and  Davidson  2007,  p.  216).  The  reasons  for  this  difference  are  not 
necessarily because of greater aversion to risk amongst females nor even the special effects 
that radiation has on childbearing and women’s bodies such as the concentration of toxins in 
fatty tissues and breast tissue and milk. It is likely related also to the social creation of women’s 6 
 
role  as  linked  to  the  well-being  of  future  generations  and  its  relationship  to  ecological 
citizenship (MacGregor 2006).  
Another aspect of risk perception discussed by researchers is that of “political anchoring.” In 
one study, the researchers noted that risk perception of nuclear power is often aligned, or 
“anchored”, with political affiliation or political ideology (Costa-Font et al. 2008) irrespective of 
knowledge of nuclear power.  Using survey data from a 2005 Eurobarometer of UK citizens, 
results show that views about nuclear power are driven by an instinctive political position that 
is often deeply held by citizens. Citizens with more left leaning views are more likely to hold 
that nuclear power is a highly risky technology as compared to those with moderate or right 
leaning political views.   
Research  on  political  anchoring  is  consistent  with  other  studies  and  it  offers  an  important 
perspective on the relationship between risk communication and risk perception. Against the 
common  view  that  risk  perception  is  largely  an  artifact  of  media  attention  or  relatively 
uninformed or emotional public reactions, the social science literature consistently shows that 
knowledge – such as scientific information or industry information – has no consistent effect on 
risk perceptions. In fact in some instances, general knowledge of nuclear power can actually 
decrease support for nuclear power (Costa-Font et al. 2008). Summarizing such findings, Slovic 
and colleagues state that “attitudes toward nuclear power are conditioned by the interplay of 
psychological, social, cultural, historical, and political factors that will not easily be changed by 
public information or educational campaigns” (Slovic et al 2000, p. 98). Based on these findings, 
it  is  likely  the  case  that  perceptions  of  risk  from  nuclear  power  development  will  vary 
considerably  by  the  general  political  orientation  of  a  jurisdiction  (e.g.,  progressive  or 
conservative).  
Perhaps even more importantly, social trust is consistently observed to be influential. Trust is 
relevant at several levels of social interaction. Trust is an important component of individual 
relationship and in relation to actors who are involved in the regulation of risky technologies. 
Where  these  actors  are  considered  to  be  untrustworthy,  then  risk  perception  is  elevated. 
However, the average citizen is not in a position to form a well-informed opinion regarding the 
trustworthiness  of  individual  actors.  In  contemporary  society,  citizens  increasingly  rely  on 
impersonal relationships with socially distant actors and agencies that are charged with the 
responsibility to protect citizens from harm. In a world of complex technological developments 
and the specialization of individual skills and abilities, we commonly find ourselves in highly 
trusting relationships with individuals and institutions that are distant and often impersonal. 
Basic levels of trust are required in order for mundane but risky activities to be undertaken and 
technologies to be utilized. For example, air transportation requires trusting relationships in 
pilots who fly us from Edmonton to Toronto, and in the trainers and credentialling agencies that 7 
 
certify  pilots,  and  in  the  many  people  performing  roles  essential  to  the  safe  operation  of 
airflight. In the same way, the Atomic Energy Board of Canada, politicians, the nuclear industry 
and other actors are in relationships that rely on citizen trust, and when trust is eroded or 
absent, then public perspectives on the risks of nuclear power are impacted accordingly. 
Given the ways in which citizens are placed in trusting relationships with actors and regulators 
of risky technologies, it is no surprise that research finds a strong and consistent relationship 
between levels of risk perception and levels of trust in institutions, information, individuals or 
other objects of trust (Whitefield et al. 2009). Trust is destroyed quickly in situations where the 
appearance of secrecy or the desire to exclude publics is evident within the regulatory context 
(Freudenburg 2004). Moreover, as indicated below, trust has become an increasingly important 
aspect of contemporary society when at the same time trust is also challenging to maintain and 
relatively easy to destroy. 
The reliance of the technological society on trustful relationships between and 
among  its  subsystems has never  been  stronger  than today.  However,  such  a 
need  for  trust  makes  people  more  and  more  sensitive  towards  situations  in 
which their investment of trust has been factually or allegedly misguided. The 
more trust is needed for implementing cooperative efforts or for coping with 
external  effects  of  social  actions,  the  more  cautious  people  are  in  assigning 
credibility to those whom they are supposed to trust (Rohrmann and Renn 2000, 
p. 32). 
Based on these insights, it is difficult to overstate the importance of trust in relation to risk 
perception. Where citizens judge the regulators and actors involved in nuclear power to be 
trustworthy, risk perception is likely to be lower. Conversely, where trusting relationships have 
been compromised, either by a history of regulatory failure, a sketchy industrial track record or 
by other challenges to trustworthiness, then the public is likely to judge nuclear power to be a 
more risky endeavour.  
A final area of interest regarding public views of risk involves the concept of stigma. As it relates 
to nuclear power development, this concept is arguably less well defined in comparison to the 
concept of trust, but there is recognition – particularly in the literature on the siting of nuclear 
waste disposal repositories – that stigma is a significant factor in community opposition to 
waste materials. In this context, stigma involves a general sense that by association with a 
particular technology the community is given a negative public image and may be shunned in 
certain circles. Citizens value the positive image of their community and stigma places this 
image at risk. Freudenburg (2004) indicates that as early as the 1980s stigma was noted as one 
of the  “special  effects”  in  the  socio-economic assessment  of nuclear waste  disposal.  Other 
effects  included  controversy  and  considerable  polarization  within  the  proposed  host 8 
 
community. More recent research from Europe and the UK also indicates that stigma is a strong 
factor in community response to nuclear issues (Sjoberg and Drottz-Sjoberg 2001; Poortinga et 
al. 2006).  
In summary, the social science literature on nuclear power is focused on understanding the 
differences between technical risk assessment and social risk assessment. The risk perceptions 
of experts are often quite different from average citizens and these differences are normally 
attributed to one or more of the following risk factors:  
•  Knowability 
•  Dread 
•  Controllability 
•  Equity 
•  Catastrophic potential 
•  Trust in risk managers and information 
•  Political alignment / ideology 
•  Gender 
•  Potential for stigma 
 
Clearly, risk perception relies on other factors than merely technical and physical probabilities 
of harm. Although risk perception of nuclear power among average citizens is often higher than 
that of experts, the social science literature is less interested in the distinction between real risk 
and perceived risk, and is more interested in understanding the factors that contribute to risk 
perception (within expert and lay communities). Although the physical risk of nuclear leaks or 
other accidents may be extremely low, these physical risks are just one (small) factor that 
contributes to the risk evaluation of citizens. Therefore, social decision-making about nuclear 
power requires attending to many social factors and not merely the probabilistic or technical 
dimensions of risk assessment.  
COUNTRY LEVEL STUDIES 
In addition to individual risk perception as discussed in the section above, some researchers 
have focused on the differences between countries and their approaches to nuclear power. In 
this analysis, the focus of attention is on historical understandings of energy development and 
the  interaction  between  nuclear  power  proponents,  political  decision  making  and  industry 
regulation.   Within  Europe,  Germany  is  currently  involved  in dismantling  its  nuclear power 
program in favour of alternative energy technologies. In contrast, France has a long history of 
nuclear power development and a French public that is largely favourable toward this energy 
policy.  9 
 
The situation in France is of particular interest, in part, because of the long history of nuclear 
power development since the 1950s. The nuclear industry in France continues to enjoy strong 
support  in  contrast  to  several  other  countries  in  Europe  that  have  taken  a  very  different 
position on development of the industry. According to one analysis, part of the reason for this 
unique French position has to do with more than a desire for energy independence; it is based 
in a more trusting relationship between citizens and regulators. 
The French saw greater need for nuclear power, had greater trust in scientists, 
industry  and  government  officials,  were  more  likely  to  believe  that  decision-
making authority should reside with the experts and government authorities, 
rather than with the people (Slovic et al. 2000, p. 57). 
Within the North American context, desire for energy independence is commonly shared with 
the French, but this is likely where the similarities end. Within the United States in particular, 
there  is  strong  opposition  to  nuclear  power  (Rosa  and  Dunlap  1994).  Accompanying  this 
opposition is considerable pressure to open up the regulatory process to much more public 
scrutiny than is the case in France. Publics consistently register a higher level of mistrust toward 
expertise  as  well  as  government  institutions  that  are  associated  with  the  nuclear  industry. 
Reasons for these differences are complex and often difficult to understand, but part of the 
answer involves different democratic cultures as well as a strong historical link – particularly in 
the United States – between nuclear power development and the military industrial complex. 
Whitefield and colleagues note this history in a recent study of U.S. views on nuclear power. 
If you accept nuclear power plants, you also accept a technoscientific-industrial-
military elite. Without these people in charge, you could not have nuclear power. 
Historically, therefore, risk was not the only factor driving opposition to nuclear 
power  for  many  citizens  in  those  early  days,  and  this  still  appears  to  be  of 
considerable importance now (Whitefield et al. 2009, p. 434).  
These  country  level  studies  are  important  because  they  provide  a  broader  view  of  public 
perception, with attention to historical developments in nuclear power, linkages to other values 
such as energy independence, and attention to important social and institutional dimensions of 
nuclear  power  development  that  extend  well  beyond  individual-level  risk  behavior. 
Government decisions to promote or dismantle a nuclear power industry are closely connected 
to  energy  demands  and  alternatives  but  also  to  the  capacity  of  regulators  to  interact  in 
constructive ways with domestic and international publics. Results from these country level 
studies show that building support for or against nuclear power requires careful attention to 
the design of regulatory institutions that are consistent with the dominant democratic culture. 
Institutional design is address in some detail in a later section of this report. 10 
 
SITING NUCLEAR WASTE REPOSITORIES 
In the public’s mind there is a close linkage between nuclear power generation and nuclear 
waste  management.  Social  science  understandings  of  risk  perception  demonstrate  the  two 
issues are influenced by similar social processes as identified in the section above. Uncertainty, 
unknowability, and trust are associated with long-term storage, and these dimensions of risk 
tend to heighten risk perception. In addition, because of impacts on future generations, moral 
concerns about long-terms storage are highlighted.   
There is evidence from countries such as Sweden that some communities are more receptive to 
nuclear waste repositories (Sjoberg 2004), particularly when they are able to see clear benefits 
for the community, have higher levels of trust in project proponents, and come to understand 
that their community is a suitable location for such a project. Notwithstanding these more 
receptive communities, a majority of siting efforts are charged with conflict, uncertainty, and 
feverish opposition to such developments, conflicts which can be viewed as value conflicts and 
not  only  disagreements  over  socio-technical  details.  Local  opposition  to  nuclear  power 
generation and waste repositories are commonly described by project proponents as a Not-In-
My-Back-Yard (NIMBY) scenario (i.e., local opponents come to selfishly enjoy the benefits of 
power generation while allowing others to suffer the risks of such activity). Although there is 
some  evidence  that  such  NIMBY type behavior  is  present  in  some  cases,  researchers  have 
repeatedly identified that NIMBY may not be at the heart of such opposition in many cases.  
Survey  data  described  by  Sjoberg  and  Drottz-Sjoberg  (2001)  shows  that  only  12%  of 
respondents were deemed to be demonstrating entirely NIMBY-like behaviour. In contrast, the 
vast majority demonstrated that opposition was based on the belief that nuclear power was 
not beneficial individually or for the country. Therefore the strict criteria for NIMBY behaviour 
was not met. In contrast, concerns were mostly expressed in terms of the health of others and 
the stigma of their community.  
These  authors  conclude  that  local  opposition  to  nuclear  waste  repositories  may  often  be 
conflictual and highly emotional, but opposition cannot accurately be described as irrational. 
Rather, there is evidence that clear concerns are expressed about the risks and uncertainties 
regarding long-term storage and these concerns require careful consideration and appropriate 
policy responses. 
Opposition to siting is neither uninformed nor overly emotional. The present 
data show that people’s risk attitudes were most affected by their perception of 
the fate of the community they lived in – either the health of people living there 
or the stigma that they believed a repository might bring about. There is nothing 11 
 
irrational about this, but waste facilities must of course be placed somewhere 
(Sjoberg and Drottz-Sjoberg 2001, p. 87). 
 These same sentiments are expressed by Kuhn (1998) who is also sensitive to the idea that 
local opposition is often more than just an emotional reaction against the siting of unwanted 
land uses. Rather, Kuhn observes a more cogent reaction by local residents to evidence of poor 
performance on behalf of the nuclear industry. 
To interpret these results as merely NIMBY-type responses misses the larger and 
more salient issue of the production of these wastes in the first place, and the 
checkered history of the nuclear industry worldwide in dealing with containment 
and safety (Kuhn 1998, p. 24). 
Finally, it is important to note in this section the history of environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) and the subcomponent of socio-economic assessment as it relates to the siting of nuclear 
waste facilities. Particularly within the United States, where social impact assessment has a 
longer history within the regulatory context, efforts to undertake socio-economic assessment 
have been highly technical in character. Data on social and economic status, indicators, and 
scientific  models  are  utilized  to  feed  socio-economic  information  into  the  larger  planning 
process. When social issues did not fit nicely into this technical model, such as findings on 
stigma or public controversy, they are labeled as being non-credible (Freudenburg 2004). These 
issues  are  then  described  as  “special  impacts”  and  were  often  not  counted  in  the  official 
account of socio-economic impacts.  
Freudenburg notes in his review of the U.S. experience with nuclear waste repositories, that 
“the intensity of opposition is a function of three sets of actors: the nature of the nuclear 
materials involved, the nature of the community or region selected as a disposal site, and the 
way in which the siting process is carried out” (2004, p. 164). In the last section of this paper, 
we describe in more detail these characteristics as elements of distributional and participatory 
equity. 
Such points about the siting process are important because they suggest that for environmental 
assessment to be comprehensive and to provide meaningful information to decision makers the 
process must move past purely technical advice. Specifically, when decisions are made that 
affect deeply held values such as intergenerational equity and fair distribution of risks and 
benefits  there  is  no  advantage  to  purely  scientific  and  technical  training  in  making  these 
decisions. In fact, what tends to happen is an effort to systematic exclude values from the 
technical  questions  of  nuclear  waste  management  and  then  only  a  partial  view  of  policy 
alternatives is explored (Sheng 2005). These efforts to segregate facts and values are a recipe 
for regulatory failure and Freudenburg notes that 12 
 
There is growing evidence that the naïve hope for a selection process that is 
‘strictly scientific’ may have an unfortunate if unforeseen consequence; it may 
be placing on the institutions of science and technology a burden that they are 
simply unable to support (2004, p. 166). 
Consistent  with  Kuhn  (1998)  and  others,  siting  processes  that  solely  rely  on  technical 
information are not likely to succeed. Instead, a comprehensive dialogue regarding the value 
and utility of nuclear energy development in concert with discussions regarding how and where 
nuclear waste will be located is likely to be a more successful public policy approach. 
CHANGING POLICY CONTEXT FOR NUCLEAR POWER 
What is new in recent debates is the explicit reframing of nuclear power in terms 
of both security of supply and as a part of the means for tackling climate change 
(Pidgeon et al. 2008, p.70).  
The  policy  context  for  nuclear  power  development  has  a  long  and  challenging  history.  In 
chronicling some of this history, Pidgeon et al. (2008) note some of the overoptimistic claims of 
industry promoters in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by the major accidents such as the fire at 
Windscale in the UK, Three Mile Island in the United States and Chernobyl in the Soviet Union. 
After these major events and the world-wide attention they garnered, a series of smaller scale 
environmental  concerns  began  to  emerge.  These  concerns  were  most  acute  in  the  siting 
processes for nuclear waste repositories and many communities resisted the stigma associated 
with such siting processes. Finally, from the public’s point of view, there has been a consistent 
stream of concern arising from these historical factors and a growing mistrust of regulators and 
industry proponents who are seen to be less than responsible in their actions (Wynne 1992; 
Rosa and Clark 1999).   
Within the Canadian context more specifically, Mehta (2005) chronicles the local opposition in 
1994 to the relicensing of the Pickering Nuclear Generation Station. Part of this story involves 
the activities of Durham Nuclear Awareness (DNA) of Oshawa that marshaled local opposition 
to  the  relicensing  process.  The  activities  of  DNA  dovetailed  with  broader  nuclear  protest 
campaigns  at  the  national  level  and  exemplify  the  classic  confrontation  between  technical 
regulatory processes and public social concern.  
 
Given  this  recent  history  of  challenge  and  conflict  in  the  nuclear  industry  we  might  share 
Mehta’s conclusions in 2005 that “nuclear power in Canada began a downward spiral [in the 
1990s] from which it is unlikely to recover” (p.115). Despite this grave prediction, however, in 
2011 the new story of nuclear power is quite different than earlier analysts anticipated. In 
several countries around the world, the option of nuclear power development has become a 13 
 
serious policy alternative because of the challenges of climate change. Nuclear power offers an 
apparent technological response for energy policy in a lower carbon future, and now draws 
attention from governments and some environmental organizations. 
In the post-Kyoto world of climate change, the energy policy community is focused on new 
priorities such as reliability of energy supply and low carbon footprints. In the debates about 
new  energy  development,  citizens  are  often  faced  with  a  trade-off  between  two  leading 
alternatives, such as coal (high carbon, plentiful) versus nuclear (low carbon, radiation risks). In 
regions like Alberta, Canada, this debate is particularly salient given the heavy dependence of 
coal fired electrical generators and the prospects of shifting some future demand for energy 
away from coal.  
In the United Kingdom, a large scale survey conducted in 2005 addressed precisely this question 
of  nuclear  energy  development,  climate  change  and  energy  policy  (Poortinga  et  al.  2006; 
Pidgeon et al. 2008).  In this survey, the public was asked about their views on nuclear power. 
Like other studies, the survey registered highly negative connotations for nuclear power and 
radioactive waste. An interesting twist in this survey, however, is how public views on nuclear 
power tend to change when set against the challenges of climate change. According to this 
research, “pursuing the nuclear option was judged by many in the group as the lesser of two 
evils…This  discourse,  of  what  we  have  termed  a  ‘reluctant  acceptance’  was  a  common 
response… (Poortinga et al. 2006, p. 2).  
Moreover, the  vast  majority of  respondents preferred to  reframe  the debate  away  from  a 
simplistic question of coal versus nuclear, toward a more complex understanding of energy 
policy alternatives. Figure 1 below emphasizes this point by demonstrating the popularity of 
alternative energy sources such as solar, wind, and hydro-electric power generation in contrast 
to the more distant enthusiasm for non-renewable energy sources.  14 
 
   
Figure  1.  Public  opinion  on  energy  sources;  summary  of  response  to  the  question  “How 
favourable or unfavourable are your overall opinions or impressions of the following energy 
sources for producing electricity currently?”  Source: Pidgeon et al. 2008. 
Based on these results, the authors conclude that 
The  consistent  message  from  the  combined  data  in  this  survey  is  that  while 
higher numbers of people are, as predicted, prepared to accept nuclear power if 
this is framed simply as a contribution to climate change mitigation, very few 
would  actively  prefer  this  as  an  option  over  renewable  sources  of  energy 
efficiency if given the choice (Pidgeon et al. 2008, p. 81). 
Results from this survey in the UK are important because they show how nuclear power begins 
to  take  on  a  more  favourable  picture  in  the  public’s  imagination  when  it  is  perceived  to 
contribute  significantly  to  climate  change  mitigation.  This  favourable  status  appears  to  be 
fragile however. If for some reason this connection between nuclear and carbon reduction 
would be challenged or begins to unravel, it is likely that the current boost in public response to 
nuclear power would be short-lived. Moreover, in spite of favourable responses to nuclear 
power as a tool for carbon reduction, publics in the UK continue to call for more attention to 
the development of renewable energy alternatives. 
Consistent with this public appetite for renewable resource development, research in policy 
sciences  also  indicates  some  support  for  a  broader  debate  about  the  most  sustainable 15 
 
alternatives  for  energy  development.  The  work  of  Sovacool  (2007)  is  particularly  relevant 
because  he  challenges  the  conventional  view  of  energy  policy  in  North  America  as  a 
dichotomous choice between coal or nuclear. As an analytical framework, Sovacool develops a 
five part criteria to evaluate the sustainability of American energy policy. These criteria include:  
•  Technical feasibility – commercially developed and available to enter the energy market 
•  Costs – whether their use would increase or decrease electricity prices 
•  Negative externalities – impact on human health and environment 
•  Reliability – dependable for generating and delivering electricity 
•  Security  –  how  safe  and  immune  such  technologies  are  from  attack  or  accident 
(Sovacool 2007, p. 102). 
Based on this evaluation criteria, it is possible to show that the best alternatives to reduce 
carbon emissions may well be clean coal and nuclear power, but when this broader set of 
sustainability criteria are applied, it turns out that other technologies are more sustainable in 
the long run. These technologies are threefold: (1) energy efficient practices that reduce energy 
demand and consumption, (2) renewable energy systems such as wind, water, biomass, and 
geothermal, and (3) small-scale distributed generation technologies where energy is produced 
in closer proximity to where it is consumed (Sovacool 2007).  
The extent to which such energy alternatives are thought to be fanciful or even dangerous is a 
testament to the ways in which public debate regarding the range of energy alternatives is 
highly  constrained  and  focused  on  the  status  quo.  In  other  words,  to  back  away  from 
conventional approaches to energy development requires the relinquishing of capital assets 
(sunk costs) and long planning horizons. These investments have an inertia that is difficult to 
overcome so that an effective public policy process will require considerable new and sustained 
effort and imagination to develop alternatives along the lines of Sovacool’s proposal.  
In summary, this section offers several insights into the changing policy context for nuclear 
power development. In contrast to previous decades when the prospects for further nuclear 
power in North America were minimal, emerging concern about conventional energy supply 
and green-house gases in particular have given the industry a new sense opportunity. This 
opportunity comes with some caveats, however, in terms of public support that is closely linked 
to the need for reductions in carbon-based energy sources. This shifting policy context is also 
influences by other interests and opportunities such as energy efficiency, renewable energy 
systems, and distributed power systems. 
SOCIAL CHANGE AND PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT 
Policy makers and industry players are instrumental in shaping the nuclear debate. But groups 
within civil society are also important contributors to this debate in a variety of ways. Social 16 
 
scientists often refer to these civil society organizations in terms of social movements. The idea 
of a social movement is defined as a form of group action or collective action that emerges in 
order to effect social change. Social movements are more than political actors. Traditionally, 
social movements were understood to be concerned with economic or material issues that 
affect a certain group of people. For instance, labour unions are studied as a social movement 
intended to organize pressure on governments and industries for improved material conditions 
(such as employment and working conditions) in exchange for labour.  
More  recently,  researchers  have  identified  that  many  social  movements  that  focus  less  on 
material or economic issues and spend more of their time developing policies and new ways of 
thinking and acting on issues such as world peace and environmental stewardship. Eyerman 
and Jamison (1991) have suggested that a distinction between social movements and “mere” 
pressure groups is that social movements engage in “cognitive praxis” with members and the 
public.  By  this  term,  the  authors  mean  “producers  of  knowledge,”  that  is,  alternatives  in 
thought that are put into practice. In a related way, some scholars believe the proliferation of 
new  social  movements  in  recent  decades  is  based  on  an  emerging  set  of  human  values, 
particularly in western societies that are oriented around a post-industrial economy. Citizen 
attention  oriented  toward  concerns  such  as  securing  needs,  financial  survival  and  the 
distribution of wealth appears to have declined relative to “post-material” values and interests 
such as lifestyle, collective identity, and respect for human and ecological diversity (Inglehart 
1995).  
One of the most widely accepted theories in the field of environmental sociology is based on 
this transformation of human values away from what is described as the Human Exceptionalism 
Paradigm  toward  a  New  Ecological  Paradigm  (Catton  and  Dunlap  1978).  Notions  of  human 
exceptionalism have to do with beliefs about the ways that humans are somehow above nature 
and in a relationship of control and domination over natural processes.  Consistent with the 
transition toward post-industrial values, the new ecological paradigm understands humans as 
less  exceptional  and  necessarily  embedded  in  and  interdependent  with  natural  processes. 
Nevertheless, contemporary society finds itself caught in a flux position between the old and 
the new in thought, behaviour, values, infrastructure and institutions. 
Gaining some understanding of these subtle processes of change in human values is important 
because  it  helps  to  explain  some  of  the  precipitating  factors  for  the  emergence  of  social 
movements and collective opposition to nuclear power in particular. In surveys that explore this 
phenomena  of  fundamental  change  in  human  values,  research  from  Dunlap  finds  a  strong 
inclination toward new ecological  thinking  where  citizens  from  many  countries  increasingly 
express post-industrial values and see themselves as being interconnected and interdependent 
with the natural world (Dunlap et al. 2000). 17 
 
Opposition to nuclear power in California during the 1960s and 1970s showed a similar pattern 
of changing values among California citizens who stopped the development of nuclear power in 
the state (Wellock 1998). Contrary to previous interpretations of the California situation that 
downplays the role of local social movements, Wellock argues that local groups were effective 
in  part  because  of  their  ability  to  marshal  new  social  values  against  the  industry.  “Values 
reached into the scientific community, changed views, and remade the terms of the debate” 
(Broadbent 1999, p.717). These post-industrial values coupled with populist movements and 
emerging concerns within the scientific community, serving to undermine faith in the industry 
during that period of time.  
Although this period of California history is now well behind us, it is not a unique story or an old 
story. Public concern about the safety of nuclear power and the social movements that form 
around these concerns continue to influence public policy and limit the development of nuclear 
power in many parts of the world. A fictional account of a nuclear accident that takes place in 
the Czech Republic, near the Austria border was the subject of a recent film produced in Austria 
called The First Day. The release of this film sparked a diplomatic incident between Austria and 
the Czech Republic and reminded European policy makers and industry leaders of the ongoing 
fear among citizens about the safety of nuclear facilities and the international dimensions of 
this debate (The Economist, March 19, 2009).  
Another recent book – by Ulrich Beck, a leading social theorist on the risk society – documents 
a  social  movement  conflict  in  Bulgaria  between  a  local  environmental  organization  and  its 
European partners, and their capacity to effectively shut down a multibillion dollar nuclear 
development proposal. 
The  pressure  exerted  by  a  small  Westphalian  environmental  group  is 
jeopardizing a multibillion dollar nuclear generation project in Bulgaria. Banks 
pulled  out  the  deal.  Justification  offered  was  the  “high  reputation  risk”  that 
forced the banks on to the defensive. Allegedly this had nothing to do with the 
evaluation  of  the  project,  even  from  an  environmental  point  of  view.  The 
measure was solely due to the protests of the group Urgewalk, Ausgestrahlt and 
its European partners… The powerbrokers of global capitalism, the banks, gave 
in without a murmur (Beck 2009, p.2). 
Research on social movements offers an important reminder about the power of civil society to 
affect change in public policy and plans for industrial development. This may happen in ways 
that are not often anticipated, especially when dealing with technologies and activities that are 
consistently perceived by the public to be risky, and where stakes are high. Social movement 
organizations  have  repeatedly  proven  to  be  effective  in  marshalling  opposition  to  nuclear 
power development. Simultaneously, they have been incubators of new values and innovators 18 
 
of institutional and individual practice that have become more legitimate as they are taken up 
by the general public.  
INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE AND MEGAPROJECTS  
Another area where sociology has made a significant contribution to issues of nuclear power 
development (and the management of risky technologies and activities in general) has to do 
with institutional risk management. This work is distinct from previously discussed work by 
Slovic and others in that the unit of analysis is changed from the individual to the institution. 
Institutions  develop  collective  practices  or  organizational  cultures  that  can  impede  perfect 
functioning.  Acknowledging  such  conditions  are  essential  in  assessing  nuclear  risks  and 
megaprojects. 
Seminal research in this field was published by Charles Perrow (1984) in his book called Normal 
Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. Perrow suggests that no matter how effective 
conventional  safety  efforts  may be,  some  accidents are  inevitable  –  and therefore normal. 
These so-called normal accidents are related to the complexity and the interconnectedness of 
processes (including human technicians) within a system. Certain kinds of systems that are 
highly complex and tightly coupled are prone to these kinds of so-called normal accidents and 
accidents are likely to be a matter of routine in these kinds of systems. He singles out nuclear 
power  plants  for  specific  attention  and  suggests  that  accidents  like  Three  Mile  Island  are 
inevitable and, given enough time, will happen as a matter of course.  
Almost 30 years have passed since Perrow’s work was completed. The strength of his original 
claim has lost some of its grip in part because his expectation of significant accidents in the 
nuclear industry has not come to fruition. Yet there are signs that limited exposures, leaks, and 
spills are a somewhat routine aspect of the nuclear industry and incidents such as Chernobyl 
and Fukushima demonstrate that the explosive danger of a complex system failure is possible.  
More significantly, however, some core ideas from Perrow have regained traction in recent 
years among prominent scholars. The idea that features of a technological system such as tight 
coupling and complexity are endemic to risky technologies is more widely accepted today than 
was  the  case  when  Perrow  first  introduced  these  concepts.  As  an  example,  the  Canadian 
scholar Thomas Homer-Dixon (2007) refers to tight coupling as an important aspect of complex 
systems and technologies within a contemporary social context. In his book on catastrophe, 
creativity and renewal, he draws on Perrow’s original work to identify the ways that systems 
such as stock markets, urban road networks, or electrical grids have feedbacks and a kind of 
interconnectivity that make them behave in ways that are not entirely expected or predictable 
(see Murphy 2004, for more detail on this point). These non-linear responses mean that small-
scale disturbances in the system can result in much larger effects or disproportionately large 19 
 
disturbances across the system. This research speaks to the challenges of managing complex 
technological  systems  –  not  simply  because  of  the  potential  for  human  error  or  gross 
negligence but because of the ways in which system design alone can behave or react in ways 
that are well beyond the normal or the controllable.  
In related literature on institutional response to disaster, scholars point to the ways in which 
the  interconnections  between  industrial  actors,  regulators,  and  technologies  can  lead  to 
surprising outcomes. Research by Clarke (1993), for instance, describes how institutions can 
repeatedly  and  systematical  lose  sight  of  the most  risky  aspects  of  their  management  and 
regulatory responsibilities. In hindsight (after an event takes place), some of these risks become 
painfully obvious and a lack of preparation for worst case scenarios appears grossly negligent. 
Clarke explains this lack of preparedness in terms of a disqualification heuristic where experts 
and decision makers can systematically disqualify or disregard information that contradicts a 
particular conviction or belief about how things ought to work. Clarke uses the example of the 
Exxon Valdez disaster to address “an under-appreciated problem in risk perception” (1993, p. 
290). He suggests that the mechanisms of information disqualification can lead organizations to 
be systematically stupid – a mindset that allows institutions to keep the system moving and to 
narrow the range of alternatives even when large-scale catastrophe is a distinct possibility. This 
mindset  comes  in  part  from  relatively  circumscribed  fields  of  knowledge  within  a  decision 
making arena. Similarly, a close relationship with regulators can weaken oversight that would 
otherwise contest disqualification heuristics. Research on the underlying causes of the space 
shuttle Columbia disaster also deals with similar issues of information management and narrow 
decision making procedures (Vaughan 2006).  
Adding to his earlier assessment of the disqualification heuristics that played into the Exxon 
Valdez disaster, Clarke (1999) develops a broad critique of the ways in which governments and 
corporations plan for accidents and disasters. He describes these planning processes as deeply 
flawed. As an example of these flaws, disaster response plan for the Exxon Valdez included no 
scenarios to respond effectively to the realistic scale or weather conditions under which this 
disaster  took  place.  Therefore,  even  beyond  planning  flaws  and  unanticipated  risks,  Clarke 
describes some of these risk management plans as operable for conditions of pure fantasy. 
Organizations  and  experts  use  plans  as  forms  of  rhetoric,  tools  designed  to 
convince  audiences  that  they  ought  to  believe  what  an  organization  says.  In 
particular,  some  plans  have  so  little  instrumental  utility  in  them  that  they 
warrant the label “fantasy documents” (1999, p.2). 
Although  Clarke’s  work  is  deeply  critical  of  government  and  industry  preparedness  and 
response to disaster, he is not claiming that major risks are derived from gross negligence, 
willful carelessness or a kind of malicious desire to do harm. Rather, these risks are result of 20 
 
institutional  blinders,  ideological  commitments  and  beliefs,  and  the  ways  in  which  humans 
(individually and in institutions) tend to disregard or disqualify information that may not be 
valued or fit within a particular worldview, and at the same time draw exclusively on evidence 
that  is  consistent  with  the  current  direction  and  aspiration  of  their  activities.  These  are 
particularly difficult challenges to overcome and require special attention to institutional design 
in order to limit the potential for harm from institutional failure. 
Clarke is not alone in drawing attention to the institutional dimensions of technological risk 
management.  Another  source  of  expert  error  is  described  by  Freudenburg  (1993)  as 
“recreancy,” that is, the failure of institutions to carry through on their responsibilities with the 
degree of vigor that society expects of them. Drawing on foundational work from Weber and 
Durkheim, Freudenburg argues that the idea of interdependence is crucial to our understanding 
of risk and recreancy in that “the very division of labour that permits many of the achievements 
of advanced industrial societies may also have the potential to become one of the most serious 
sources of risk and vulnerability” (1993, p. 914).  Adding to this idea of recreancy, Freudenburg 
also developed the term ‘atrophy of vigilance’ to characterize how (over time) the attentiveness 
of managers and regulators tends to diminish, and therefore risks become greater as the time 
period between accidents or incidents becomes greater (1992). 
 
Social science shows that the institutional analysis of risk management requires attention to 
risk-enhancing processes such as: 
•  Tight coupling 
•  Disqualification heuristics 
•  Fantasy documents  
•  Recreancy 
•  Atrophy of vigilance 
 
Another perspective on the institutional dimensions of risk management comes from research 
on  the  construction  of  megaprojects.  Using  data  primarily  from  megaprojects  in  Europe, 
Flyvbjerg and his colleagues (2003) identify a fairly consistent pattern in the development of 
megaprojects such as roads, bridges and other large infrastructure developments. One of the 
common  features  of  these  projects  is  the  massive  cost  overruns  that  are  absorbed  by  tax 
payers. These cost overruns are a result of poor planning, a lack of transparency and a lack of 
public accountability that allows developers and regulators to conceive of such projects with 
little attention to a wide range of complexities, uncertainties and risks.  
 
One piece of evidence for costs overruns is illustrated in Figure 2 below. The data shows cost 
overruns  in  megaprojects  over  the  past  century  are  becoming  more  common  and  the 21 
 
magnitude of these overruns is also increasing. Although this research is not focused on nuclear 
power  development  per  se,  there  are  clear  parallels  here  in  terms  of  the  scale  of  these 
megaprojects,  and  more  importantly,  the  level  of  public  financing  that  goes  into  the 
construction of such projects. The main thrust of the argument here is that megaprojects are 
often planned in a somewhat Newtonian world of direct cause and effect where projects go 
according to plan. If history is any guide, however, “the world of megaproject preparation and 
implementation is a highly risky one where things happen only with a certain probability and 
rarely turn out as originally intended” (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003, p. 6). 
 
   
Figure 2. A century of cost overruns in 111 projects (constant dollars). Source: Flyvbjerg et al. 
2003. 
A solution to this dilemma of risky megaprojects proposed by these authors is to include better 
information for decision-making as well as good communication. The authors also call for a 
more democratically open and transparent process whereby accountability for the responsible 
use of public funds is of paramount importance. Flyvbjerg pays special attention to the link 22 
 
between  project  risks,  private  sector  interests,  public  funds  and  accountability.  These 
connections are inherently difficult to make and require careful attention to the institutional 
arrangement  that  are  intended  to  promote  accountability  for  the  use  of  public  funds  and 
accountability for risk in particular. The principles of “most likely development” (MLD) are put 
forward as a way to promote full risk assessment. This includes attention to the most risky parts 
of a project and a clear understanding of the worst-case scenarios. Moreover, the authors claim 
that 
Public financing or financing with a sovereign guarantee and no risk capital does 
not reduce risk or risk costs. It only transfers risk from lenders to taxpayers, and 
so is likely to increase the total risk and costs of a project (2003, p. 84). 
These  concerns  about  institutional  arrangements  and  attention  to  transparency  and 
accountability are entirely consistent with other risk scholars who are focused more explicitly 
on  the  nuclear  power  industry  in  North  America,  not  to  mention  the  important  ethical 
implications discussed later in this paper. In their analysis of risk perception toward nuclear 
power in the U.S., Whitefield and his co-authors claim that “those who believe that nuclear 
power is an essential part of American’s future energy supply will need to devote as much 
attention to institutional design and performance as they do to reactor design if they hope to 
win public support” (2009, p.436). 
Based on the general trend in recent literature where perception of risk is high and the risk 
implications of megaprojects with regard to cost overruns are more apparent, social science 
offers a wide range of alternatives to consider the institutional dimensions of risk management 
and project development. Recommendations for institutional design and performance to take 
account of the issues raise in this paper are presented in the final section of the paper.  
DOING ETHICS ABOUT NUCLEAR POWER 
Decisions  about  nuclear  power  development  can  draw  on  economic,  social,  technical,  and 
ecological  facts,  but  must  still  be  decided  in  light  of  whether  and  how  nuclear  energy 
generation might be good for a jurisdiction. Risk assessment is founded upon which things are 
most valued and whether the technology places these valued things at risk (Rohrmann & Renn 
2000). Doing ethics is this process of determining what is “good” and how we should live in 
order to “do what is good.” Pursuing the highest good (sunnum bonum, literally, “the end goal”) 
is the prime human purpose according to classical philosophers. At the least, they believed, 
what is good was not to be determined solely on the basis of human preferences, desires, and 
perceived needs. 23 
 
There are a variety of different ways of doing ethics or deciding what is “the good.” The two 
main approaches to ethics can be summarized in terms of duty or consequences, or the means-
end distinction. On one hand, the higher good might be in the consequences that result from 
action, that is, the ends. On the other hand, we may be seen as having a duty to be good. The 
saying  “the ends deserve  the  means”  characterizes  the  first  approach;  one  might  do  what 
would be considered bad or wrong in order to accomplish good ends (e.g., stealing to provide 
for one’s family, or donating to charity money gotten by unethical business practices). Many 
ethical  disputes  arise  from  fundamental  differences  in  social  actors’  basic  approaches  to 
determining what is good and ethical. This is particularly true of the very complicated decisions 
about nuclear energy that more resemble ethical messes (“wicked problems“) than “tame” 
problems (King 1993).  
Philosophers from Plato to Kant have insisted that some things – humans for certain – are not 
to be considered only as means to an end, that is, for their use value. The value associated with 
human beings is often due to a belief that humans have intrinsic value, that is, that their value 
is located in themselves. A competing view is that humans have been given value from some 
external source, such as a divine being. Thus, some disputes are around how and why and what 
to view as good or to give moral consideration. Such disputes will arise in the nuclear energy 
debate  as  citizens  debate  whether  present  generations  or  future  generations  or  economic 
growth or energy-consumptive lifestyles or nature should be given moral consideration and 
how nuclear power generation fits in as a means to what ends.  
Another general distinction is that of private goods and common or public goods. The former 
are those things that individuals use or possess and this use excludes the use of the good by 
other people. Common goods are shared by all. Public goods are common goods specifically 
delivered or protected by collective action such as governments. A stable energy supply is a 
public good, as is environmental health. Money made by a power company would be a private 
good. This distinction is important as there are a variety of benefits and risks to nuclear power. 
The  ethics  of  decision-making  must  carefully  weigh  which  goods  will  accrue  to  individuals 
(including corporations) and publics, particularly if public (governmental) investment occurs as 
it has in most nuclear projects. In such situations the risk of economic loss becomes public, 
while the economic benefits (in terms of profit) remain largely private. It is also particularly 
telling that the risks of nuclear accident have become public expenses as private insurance only 
covers  a  small  percentage  of  the  nuclear  liability.  Finally,  since  the  state  (the  public)  is 
responsible for environmental protection and social stability, ethical decisions must evaluate 
whether placing these public goods at risk is adequately exchanged for other public benefits 
(such as energy sufficiency, carbon reduction, or specific economic development) and not just 
privatized goods. In other words, the degree of industry-government partnership in nuclear 24 
 
power generation is an important ethical consideration that transcends economic and technical 
aspects of the nuclear issue.  
Ultimately,  ethics  are  social  processes  as  discussion  and  debate  proceeds  over  competing 
definitions of what is to be considered good and what is to be valued. Still, there are a number 
of  principles  that  can  help  clarify  the  ethics  of  nuclear  power  development.  As  we  have 
described  above,  attention  should  be  given  to  how  the  social  processes  of  valuation  and 
deliberation  proceed.  Like  all  social  phenomena,  ethical  debate  is  often  characterized  by 
uneven power relations as some actors are better able to express their values or are given 
greater access to media or decision-makers. Furthermore, distrust, dread and other concerns 
identified  above  will  inhibit  open  deliberation  on  the  ethics  of  nuclear  power  and  the 
consequent decisions to be made.  
APPLIED ETHICS OF HARM AND EQUITY 
Many concerns about nuclear power generation have to do with the potential for harm, and 
this is often the way that the ethics of nuclear energy decisions are posed (e.g., Timmerman 
2003). The likelihood of harm and the magnitude of harm are very different factors. To some 
extent, they can be calculated (as is discussed in other sections of this document). However, the 
two factors are not calculated the same way so cannot be simply compared against each other; 
furthermore, the ethical weighting given to each factor will vary among actors. Unintended 
harms  are  a  type  of  “moral  externality”  that  should  not  be  weighed  strictly  against  more 
preferred end products of business activities (Gowri 2004).  
An  even  more  significant  ethical  issue  is  the  distribution  of  harm.  One  must  ask  if  some 
communities or regions will be (or are more likely to be) harmed (or threatened with harm)? 
Ethical systems will answer this question differently: Is it ok to harm some in order that a 
greater good is produced? Whose greater good? As a corollary, we must also ask about the 
distribution of benefits. We also generally question the fairness of a situation where someone 
benefits from another person being harmed. 
It is of particular ethical concern if the benefits and harms are not equally distributed among 
social actors. Thus, equity is another key ethical principle. Most theories of justice have to do 
with whether or not potential harms and benefits are fairly distributed; the state is generally 
considered  to  be  responsible  for  ensuring  equity,  as  well  as  protecting  public  goods. 
Distributional equity occurs when goods (and bads) are fairly distributed by whatever means 
are considered to be the measure of fairness. For example, hard work is usually considered to 
be a fair means of distributing income, but wealth is usually not an explicitly acceptable means 
for the distribution of environmental risks: should poorer people face more pollution?  25 
 
Who benefits from nuclear power, and who may be harmed? Does it matter that harm or 
benefits may be unequally distributed? What are the circumstances by which harm or benefit 
may be distributed? These are among the ethical questions which the principles of harm and 
equity force us to raise. 
There are a variety of types of equity that help to clarify the ethical issues in terms of nuclear 
power.  The  most  obvious  issue  with  nuclear  power  production  is  that  of  intergenerational 
equity, that is, equity between generations. One of the most pressing unresolved problems with 
nuclear energy is that of nuclear waste. Intergenerational equity makes us ask if it is ethical to 
spread  the  responsibility  for  the  wastes  hundreds  of  thousands  of  years  into  the  future 
(Marshall 2005; Wilson 2003), especially if only generations present in the next few decades 
will benefit? Furthermore, the political system is currently organized so that future generations 
have no direct voice in decisions that will affect them. Picking up the issue of intergenerational 
justice, Taebi  and Kloosterman  (2008, p.177)  insist  the advocates  of nuclear  waste  storage 
options and nuclear energy in general “should explain why they are willing to transfer all the 
risks for a very long period of time (200,000 years) to future generations.” 
Intragenerational equity has already been mentioned. This principle is about equity across the 
present – that all are fairly benefited or harmed, have equal opportunities, and so on (Attfield 
1998). Hard work and luck are partly considered fair means of improving one’s social position, 
but  existing  social  conditions  may  also  be  products  of  past  inequities.  In  addition,  some 
circumstances give certain actors advantages. For example, growing up in a well-to-do or well-
connected family often leads to a better education, jobs, and position, more money or other 
resources, a capability to access and respond to detailed technical information, and the skills to 
speak before a hearing in the “proper” manner, and get one’s views heard. This inequality leads 
to  concerns  about  participatory  or  procedural  equity.  This  form  of  equity  has  to  do  with 
whether participation in the processes of our society is fair and equal for all. Decision-making 
on nuclear power must be very careful to proceed ethically on participation and procedure; 
particularly in the case of nuclear power megaproject as it would be easy to let powerful and 
well-resourced stakeholders drive decisions.  
Sheng (2005) describes issues of participatory equity in the process to develop a Canadian 
nuclear  waste  disposal strategy. The  structure of these  consultations  required  very  specific 
technical understanding and a narrow construction of what types of citizen concerns were to be 
considered legitimate. The format excluded other forms of expression in the hearings. In order 
to express their concerns, participants were forced to translate their core values into something 
else, or communicate in legalistic and technical ways with which few had familiarity. The result 
was  participatory  inequity  that  privileged  a  limited  subset  of  stakeholders  and  what  they 
valued.  26 
 
A related ethical issue would be if a relatively impoverished community was showered with 
promises of economic prosperity for siting a nuclear reactor in the community. In some ways 
this might be an issue of spatial equity (Stanley 2009). “Not in my backyard” campaigns may 
enable  some  communities  to  reject hazards that  other  communities might  have  to  accept. 
Intragenerational inequity in the form of socio-economic disadvantage can become a form of 
coercion despite the appearance of procedural fairness (Blowers 2003). A great deal of research 
shows the environmental injustices of poor distribution of environmental hazards (the most 
recent summary is Mohai, Pellow & Roberts 2009; see also Brulle & Pellow 2006). In the United 
States, poor and racialized communities have much larger percentages of hazardous waste and 
toxic sites, while in Canada Aboriginal communities and working class communities based on 
resource  extraction  are  particularly  likely  to  have  higher  levels  of  various  types  of 
contamination  or  other  environmental  harms  (Agyeman,  et  al  2009).  More  affluent 
communities may have more resources, connections and skills to resist undesirable land uses. 
But if something is NIMBY a more ethical approach should perhaps be NIABY – “not in anyone’s 
backyard” (Hannon & Norton 1997). One can test the NIMBY vs NIABY ethic by locating nuclear 
energy production near to where it will be used, rather than in a remote site. Spatial equity 
suggests that the beneficiaries and risks be located near each other; imagine a reactor near 
Edmonton if the purpose is consumer demand for electricity.  
Another type of equity may be more controversial, but it clearly demonstrates how the values 
upon which ethical differences rest are the products of different social milieus. Interspecies 
equity implies that other species should be treated with fairness and that human decisions for 
the good of the human species may be instances of ecological injustice.  
In Canadian society, the dominant conceptions of nature are as “natural resources” for human 
use.  Nature  may  even  be  euphemized  as  “ecosystem  services”  or  “natural  capital.”  Such 
anthropocentric perspectives represent the Human Exceptionalism Paradigm at work, that is, 
nature’s  purpose  is  to  serve  humanity.  Logically,  there  is  no  a  priori  reason  to  reject 
interspecies  equity  as  an  ethical  principle.  That  we  have  not  typically  extended  moral 
consideration beyond humans is a cultural practice that does appear to be changing (Dunlap 
2000). 
Most  of  us  do  not  speak  of  other  animals  as  our  “brother”  but  this  is  part  of  Aboriginal 
traditions as well as a minor current in other religions. Extending such ethical consideration, 
however, is something that the Roman Catholic Bishops of Alberta recommend in a June 2009 
pastoral reflection on nuclear energy in Alberta. A comparable statement was issued by bishops 
from five Christian denominations in Saskatchewan (Bishops 2009). In both cases, the religious 
leaders push ethical consideration from purely human-centred concerns to responsibility for 27 
 
the integrity of all of creation. In their process of ethics, nature has intrinsic value and is not 
merely to serve human purposes. 
To conclude, the following principles are some of the ethical principles that should be part of 
nuclear decision making: 
•  Means/Ends 
•  Use Value/Intrinsic Value 
•  Private Goods/Public Goods 
•  Harm 
•  Equity 
￿  Distributional equity 
￿  Participatory equity 
￿  Inter-generational equity 
￿  Intra-generational equity 
￿  Spatial equity 
￿  Interspecies equity 
These ethical principles are only a few that are relevant to consideration of nuclear power. 
Roughly, we might use the following schematic for a method of applied ethics.  
1.  Consider  the  relevant  ethical  principles  (which  assumes  dialogue  about  what 
principles are relevant). 
2.  See if the facts on the ground align or don't align with the ethical principles in #1 
(e.g., if all people have equitable participation or spatial distribution of risks is not 
fair).  
3.  If they do, judge the particular action/issue/whatever as ethically acceptable or not. 
It is important to emphasize that not only are the final decisions to be considered ethical goods, 
but  an  ethical  means  of  equitable  and  non-coercive  participation  must  also  be  followed. 
Furthermore, it is unethical for communication of technical information to be misleading or 
confusing (Dombrowski 2007). Research by both Endres (2007) and Stanley (2009) show that 
the  language  used  in  the  debates  about  nuclear  energy  are  often  means  of  coercion  and 
misrepresentation. 
ETHICAL SPECIFICS OF NUCLEAR 
There  is  considerable  experience  from  other  jurisdictions  that  can  help  to  inform  the 
consideration of the ethics of nuclear power. Above all, nuclear energy should make a positive 
contribution  to  society,  and  be  pursued  in  a  way  that  reduces  risks  and  enhances  public 
benefits (Mizuo 2008). Care must also be taken that the technical mindset not overwhelm other 28 
 
social and ethical considerations and that diverse knowledges be brought to bear (di Norcia 
2002). 
A  number  of  writers  have  emphasized  the  culture  of  engineering  and  technology  as  being 
particularly influential in how ethical deliberation can proceed (Hauser-Kastenberg, et al 2003; 
Ross & Athanassoulis 2009). For example, Dombrowski (2007) describes the commissions after 
both the Challenger and Columbia shuttle disasters. The later reports highlighted issues in the 
hierarchy and structure which silenced employees and replaced ethical responsibilities with 
technical proofs. While never distancing personal integrity from decisions, the commissions 
placed ethical duty in the context of organizations, culture and social context. Applying this to 
the nuclear energy industry implies such possibilities as that the social and economic contexts 
of energy corporations may affect operation of power plants; similarly governmental practice 
may shaped a culture of distrust about “consultations” and approvals of energy production 
projects (Garvin & Masuda 2006). Topcu (2008) discerned similar distrust about insufficient 
transparency and procedural equity in France. 
Others  have  been  critical  of  the  way  that  nuclear  energy  has  been  propounded.  Shrader-
Frechette (2011) argues that methods of comparing the greenhouse gas emissions of nuclear 
energy versus other energy sources has often been done in ways that border on unethical 
representation of the benefits. Shrader-Frechette is concerned that the dedication to go the 
nuclear  route  locks  out  opportunities  to  pursue  renewable  and  other  forms  of  energy  or 
conservation. Her analysis of 30 recent nuclear analyses shows that industry-funded studies 
tend to trim cost data and show other signs of conflict of interest (Shrader-Frechette 2009). 
Thus, she concludes, the economics of nuclear power are not as appealing as often presented, 
particularly as a tradeoff for addressing climate change. This highlights the need to ask the key 
question of social ethics – “who stands to benefit” from nuclear energy development. 
One beneficiary is the population of a region if nuclear energy ultimately provides more stable 
and lower cost (in both economic and environmental terms) electricity than other forms of 
energy production. Such an ethical argument must be based on good cost analyses, as research 
shows that nuclear power is often considerably more expensive than projected. 
Wellock’s  (1998)  research  shows  the  US  nuclear  industry  declined  from  the  1960s  onward 
primarily  because  financial  institutions  withdrew  the  enormous  resources  needed  to  fund 
construction.  Feiveson’s  (2009  p.  138)  recent  analysis  is  that  “Nuclear  power  seems  to  go 
forward  only  where  governments  heavily  subsidize  is  operation.”  This  raises  substantial 
questions about private and public goods, benefits and responsibilities. Levendis et al (2006) 
argue that the free market must decide the fate of nuclear energy projects. In their analysis, 
reducing government regulation that “stifles” nuclear entrepreneurship is the ethical thing to 
do. Although Mitchell (1999) touts the benefit of codes of ethics adopted by businesses and 29 
 
industry, the track record of voluntary compliance is not good (Borck & Coglianese 2009). It is 
hard to understand how the ethical duty to protect public safety in light of duty to shareholders 
can  be  produced  without  public  (nee  governmental)  oversight.  Part  of  ethical  deliberation 
about  the  choice  of  the  good  is  evidence  about  the  huge  expenditures  of  resources  for 
construction, and track records of nuclear plants operating less than expected (each of the 
Bruce  power  plants  in  Ontario)  or  not  at  all  (as  at  the  Shoreham  NY  plant,  Aron  1997). 
Decommissioning a nuclear station must also be considered an ethical issue as plans for it 
involve various possible harms, intergenerational equity (has sufficient bond be put in place?), 
types of responsibility, and public/private concerns (is the public on the hook?) (Surrey 1992). 
Additionally, a nuclear plant must be placed in its overall context. Nuclear energy production 
generates demand for uranium. The uranium mining and enrichment industries have caused 
environmental  injustice,  particularly  in  Aboriginal  communities  (Bullard  &  Johnson  2000; 
Charley, et al. 2004; Lovelace 2009; Keeling & Sandlos 2009; Quigley, et al. 2000). The most 
celebrated Canadian case is that of the Eldorado Mine at Port Radium on Great Bear Lake in the 
Northwest Territories. Documented in the video A Village of Widows (Blow 1999), workers and 
their relatives in the Dene community of Deline claim that inadequate safety precautions have 
led to high cancer mortality, which is denied by government and corporate authorities (See also 
http://  www.sombake-themoneyplace.com  and  the  Action  Plan  to  Address  Community 
Concerns  available  at  http://reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/ 
1209682932_Port%20Radium%20Action%20Plan.pdf.).  
The  above  matters  and  the  ethical  principles  noted  are  only  some  of  the  facets  of  the 
momentous decision to include nuclear power in the energy production system. All indications 
are that decision makers ought to move slowly in the decision-making processes of whether 
and  how  nuclear  power  can  fit  in.  One  conservative  approach,  advocated  by  the  Catholic 
bishops as well as other stakeholders, is that of applying caution to gather evidence that no 
harm  will  result  and  that  equity  can  be  accomplished  before  embarking  on  irrevocable 
development. 
THE BIGGER PICTURE OF THE GOOD LIFE 
The  above  discussion  leaves  out  some  significant  bigger  issues.  Historian  and  sociologist 
Jacques Ellul (1982) insists that nuclear power is representative of the human lust for power – 
including electrical power, but also power in general, and private power for some in society. 
Often called a technological pessimist, Ellul demands that we consider the bigger questions of 
nuclear energy, such as whether there are legitimate limits to what human ingenuity should try 
to accomplish. These questions about limits are profoundly philosophical, ethical and religious 
questions. Is it good for humans to do whatever we want to try to technologically achieve? 30 
 
Only slightly smaller in scope is the question of Why do we want/need nuclear energy? That the 
typical answer is “to fill needs [sic] for electricity” is no real answer. An ethical stance is to 
query whether these energy “needs” are really demands and desires. North American lifestyles 
are very energy-consumptive, the choices made collectively over time have made us energy-
dependent with an ecological footprint that outstrips nearly all other humans on the planet as 
well as the available resources of the planet over the long term (www.worldwatch.org). Is that 
energy-intensive lifestyle good? Is it good for us humans, the natural environment or the global 
biosphere? Is it good to be unsustainable? And, is it fair? That is, does our energy and resource 
consumption help produce inequities elsewhere on the globe (Roberts & Parks 2007)? If the 
end goal of human purpose is the sunnum bonum, then we need to ask the broader ethical 
questions about what is the good life, and whether nuclear energy production is an appropriate 
means to pursuit of that goal.  
SUMMARY 
The social science literature on nuclear power development is vast and expanding very quickly, 
therefore limiting quick conclusions. But there are a few strong and consistent points in this 
literature, and these points are summarized below: 
•  Risk perception is associated with consequences to other valued objects 
•  Public risk perception is different than expert risk perception and involve distinct forms 
of rationality 
•  Risk  perception  of  nuclear  power  is  persistently  associated  with  issues  of  dread, 
unknowability and lack of control 
•  Risk perception is difficult to change, and anchored to political affiliations / ideology 
•  Risk perception is closely linked to levels of trust in risk management institutions 
•  Differences in risk perception between countries are due in part to political aspiration 
such as energy independence and different political models of risk management 
•  Opposition to nuclear waste repositories are not simply reliant on a NIMBY syndrome 
•  Recent public acceptance of nuclear power is contingent (perhaps temporarily) on the 
ability of the nuclear development to facilitate lower carbon futures 
•  Debates about energy development between fossil fuels and nuclear power represent a 
false dichotomy (that exclude options of demand reduction and renewable energy) 
•  Social  protest  movements  are  driven  by  social  values  and  can  have  real  impacts  of 
energy policy debates 
•  Technologies that involve tight-coupling and close feedbacks are recognized as risky 
•  Disaster response plans are not always well developed and don’t anticipate worst case 
scenarios 
•  Megaproject risks involve cost overruns and require greater public accountability 31 
 
•  Decision-making is inherently ethical judgment because competing values are weighed 
•  Both harm and equity must be assessed 
•  Other ethical principles involved in nuclear issues include intergenerational equity, the 
distributional equity of risks, equity in participation and fairness to nature 
•  Managing  risky  technologies  and  activities  requires  risk  issue  management  which 
involves meaningful interaction with science, policy, and civil society. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE 
The  design  of  public  institutions  and  public  processes  to  more  effectively  deal  with  risky 
activities  and  risky  technologies  is  an  important  challenge  in  contemporary  society.  This 
challenge is exacerbated by several factors. First, civil society is less trusting and less deferential 
to all forms of expertise. Challenging expert opinion of science with alternative evidence has 
become  common  place.  This  transformation  has  implications  for  risk  managers  and  a  risk 
assessment that is based on narrow scientific evidence or a limited definition of probabilistic 
risk. Second, civil society and social values are more diverse than was the case in previous 
decades. Through education, immigration, and the on-going impact of social movements within 
the environmental community, civil society is culturally and ideologically pluralist. At times this 
pluralism results in deep divisions about issues of livelihood and sustainability. Third, there are 
emerging  complexities  and  uncertainties  that  limit  our  ability  to  made  decisions  with  full 
knowledge of impacts on others within the human and non-human world. Prions that that lead 
to  mad  cow  disease  and  the  human  variant  CJD;  nanotechnology  and  the  maintenance  of 
natural processes in plants and animals; persistent organic pollutants and the maintenance of 
environmental quality, along with many other complex processes lead to uncertainty and a 
need to make decisions within the context of such technological and environmental change.  
Given these social realities, the issue of risk management through institutional design is no 
small task. Moreover, there are precious few examples within the real world to signal cases 
where  institutional  design  has  made  an  important  difference  in  the  management  of  risky 
technologies  and  activities.  What  we do  know,  however,  is that  simple  solutions that  limit 
accountability, rely on overly technical risk assessments, and fail to recognize or account for risk 
and uncertainties are not likely to lead to successful technological innovation and wide-spread 
social acceptance. 
Toward a more careful consideration of institutional design, Canadian scholar William Leiss 
(2001) has invested his career in understanding risk controversies and in imagining ways of 
improving the risk management capacities of responsible institutions. A primary concern for 
Leiss is the way that risk management institutions persistently fail to understand the essential 
difference between risk management and risk issue management. Risk management is mostly 32 
 
associated with technical risk assessment, where probabilities of death or harm are calculated 
for  a  particular  technology.  In  contrast,  risk  issue  management  involves  attention  to  risk 
communication, and careful attention to the nexus of science, policy and civil society.  Risk 
issues management is fundamentally about the contested domains of a particular issue and 
how risk issues are formulated, managed, and translated by various publics. In this sense, risk 
issue  management  involves  attention  to  stakeholder  interaction,  overcoming  intractable 
behaviours,  and  dealing  with  high  levels  of uncertainty,  as  well  as  attending  to the  values 
particular stakeholders perceive to be at risk (2001, p.10). 
Based  on  these  qualities  of  risk  issue  management,  Leiss  goes  on  to  describe  the  basic 
competencies  of  risk  issue  management  for  institutions.  These  competencies  are  briefly 
outlined below (p. 288). 
1.  Accepting responsibility – this involves accepting the legitimacy of a risk controversy 
such  as  nuclear  power.  Rather  than  dismissing  risk  perception  as  uninformed  or 
misguided,  risk  issue  management  would  involve  meaningful  interactions  with  the 
public and accepting responsibility and obligations to understand and address risks that 
are represented within the public sphere as opposed to dismissing them as unfounded. 
 
2.  Addressing uncertainties – recalling the persistent public perception of nuclear power 
risk as dreadful, unknowable and uncontrollable, these aspects of uncertainty are a 
fundamental challenge when dealing with this risk issue.  
 
3.  Managing  the  science/policy  interface  –  the  science  policy  interface  involves  a 
willingness to take responsibility for engaging with the public in a timely fashion and in 
representing  the  complexity  of  scientific  evidence,  and  historical  experiences  with 
nuclear power in other parts of the world.  
 
4.  Communicating risks appropriately – the tendency within traditional risk management 
institutions is to announce and defend the development of a risky technology, and then 
invest considerable resources in marketing the risky decision to the public. In contrast, 
appropriate risk communication involves longer-term dialogue about risks that are fair, 
open and well informed.  
Further to this last point, Leiss calls for the development of an arms-length agency to facilitate 
the science policy interaction and to support this longer-term dialogue regarding the merits of a 
risky technology. 
Put directly, those actors should surrender control over the process of consensus 
building for risk understanding, as well as the risk messages themselves that 33 
 
emerge from that process. These tasks should be entrusted to independent and 
credible third parties who are capable of demonstrating to the wider public that 
they can be trusted to create a fair, informed, and disinterested forum for these 
risk dialogues (Leiss 2001, p. 291).  
Decision-making about nuclear energy will weigh various notions of what is good, and use a 
variety of ethical principles and social science research conclusions. Information will have to be 
collection to determine whether the facts and projections align with the principles. Key among 
these principles and the public consultations, procedures, dialogue and decision-making is if 
these  processes  themselves  are  ethical,  that  is,  if  they  are  open,  transparent,  fulfilling  the 
principles of participatory equity and so on. Harm and benefit, and their distribution, collective 
goods and justice are other key principles to be used in the dynamic process of deciding on the 
“ifs” and “hows” of nuclear energy production. Technical, economic and social facts will provide 
additional insights for use in ongoing analysis of the extent of nuclear development.  
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